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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER WAGONER, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
WATERSLIDE INCORPORATED dba ; 
BURCHCREEK WATERSLIDE, ; 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
vs. ) 
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING, ] 
Third-Party Defendant.' 
• Case No. 20410 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action by plaintiff against defen-
dant in which plaintiff alleged he was injured while a business 
visitor at defendant's water slide. Defendant filed a third-
party complaint for contribution against thrid-party defendant, 
Great Basin Engineering. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on October 2 and 3, 1984, 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. The court directed a ver-
dict in favor of third-party defendant. The jury returned a ver-
dict against plaintiff on the complaint, finding that defendant 
was not negligent, and the court entered judgment on the verdict 
for defendant. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the trial court judgment 
based on the jury verdict in its favor. Third-party defendant is 
not a party to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a negligence action by plaintiff Walter Wagoner 
against the owner/operator of the Burchcreek Waterslide in Ogden, 
Utah, for an injury to plaintiff's right large toe while he was 
using the water slide. This water slide is open similar to a 
bathtub, rather than being a closed tube. It is made of 
fiberglass sections bolted together to form a continuous slide. 
Neal Citte assembled it in 1979 and owned it with his father as a 
family business. He purchased the fiberglass sections from the 
manufacturer, Professional Fiberglass Products, Inc., an Oklahoma 
company. The sections are 52 inches wide at the widest part. 
The side wall extends up 34 1/2 inches to form a smooth lip 
rounded on three sides. Beyond the rounded lip or rim, the 
fiberglass extends out horizontally a few more inches. (Trial 
Exhibit 1P, pp. 12 and 14 of which are attached in the Addendum 
to this Brief) This fiberglass edge was not sharp, but was 
simply the unfinished end of the piece of fiberglass, unfinished 
so that it was not smooth to the touch. (R. p. 432; Trial 
Exhibits 20D, 21D, 22D. Trial Exhibit 20D is attached in the 
Addendum to this Brief.) 
Plaintiff was 28 years old at the time of the accident. 
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He was using the water slide as a paying customer, along with his 
wife and children, his wife's adult brothers, and one of their 
friends. On the day of the accident, he had made five or six 
complete trips down the slide before the trip on which he was 
injured. Then as he was riding on his stomach on the plastic mat 
provided by defendant, he went around a curve on the slide and 
apparently allowed his right foot to hang over the side beyond 
the rounded lip, and cut the top of his right large toe as it 
scraped along the unfinished outside edge of fiberglass. 
Plaintiff was treated as an out-patient at McKay-Dee 
Hospital and went home that night. About three weeks after the 
accident, he reinjured his toe. This subsequent injury greatly 
complicated his recovery. 
The unfinished edge on which plaintiff cut his toe, is 
present on both sides of the slide for the entire length of the 
slide. The fiberglass sections were supplied in that condition 
from the manufacturer, and defendant assembled them according to 
the manufacturer's directions. There was nothing broken or out 
of repair which caused the accident. Defendant's employees 
inspected and maintained the slide conscientiously, and super-
vised its use by customers. Large signs were posted displaying 
safety rules. 
There was substantial competent evidence that the 
unfinished fiberglass edge is open and obvious to anyone 
approaching the slide or using it; that riders are able to 
control their arms and legs in order to keep their hands and feet 
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from coming near the unfinished edge; and that riders do not get 
near the outside edge unless they engage in horseplay in viola-
tion of posted safety rules. 
Two of defendant's former employees testified that they 
observed plaintiff engaging in horseplay on the slide, warned him 
to stop on more than one occasion, and observed him continue to 
misbehave. 
In the six years this water slide had been in operation 
up to the time of trial, over one million rides had been taken 
and plaintiff was the only person ever to cut himself on the 
fiberglass edge. 
Two witnesses testified as experts on the design and 
construction of the water slide. Both Val T. Stratford and Neal 
Citte gave the opinion that the fiberglass edge was not an 
unreasonable risk to users of the water slide. 
The trial court instructed the jury fully on the appli-
cable law, including the general definition of negligence (R. p. 
358) and the application of that standard to the condition of the 
water slide as it existed at the time of plaintiff's injury. (R. 
p. 352) 
The court instructed the jury to determine whether or 
not the defendant was negligent with respect to the unfinished 
fiberglass edge on the slide and thereby exposed plaintiff to an 
unreasonable risk of injury. (Interrogatory No. 1 , R. p. 351) 
The jury answered this interrogatory in the negative, and 
according to the court's instructions in that event, the jury 
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returned a verdict without answering further interrogatories. 
Based on the jury verdict, judgment was entered for defendant. 
(R. pp. 389-390. A copy of the special verdict containing the 
court's instruction on reasonable risk and unreasonable risk, the 
instruction defining negligence, and the judgment on the jury 
verdict, R. pp. 350-358 and 389-390, are attached in the Addendum 
to this Brief) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether plaintiff's claim that the trial court com-
mitted reversable error in not instructing the jury on the duty 
of a possessor of land to warn business invitees of conditions on 
the land which involve an unreasonable risk of harm, is a claim 
of harmless error. 
2(a). Whether plaintiff waived his right to complain 
about the instruction given to the jury on the definition of 
"unreasonable risk" by his failure to object at trial and his 
failure to submit a proposed instruction. 
2(b). Whether the instructions to the jury read 
together as a whole, adequately informed the jury about the legal 
concept of "unreasonable risk.11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affirmative duty of a possessor of land to exercise 
reasonable care to protect invitees by warning or repair, extends 
only to conditions or activities on the land which present an 
unreasonable risk of harm. The jury found that the condition of 
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which plaintiff complains did not involve unreasonable risk of 
harm. Therefore, the jury was not required to reach the question 
of whether defendant breached a duty to warn, and any lack of 
instruction to the jury on duty to warn was harmless to the 
outcome. 
In any event, there was no duty to warn of this con-
dition which was as open and obvious to plaintiff as to 
defendant. 
Plaintiff waived any claim of error in the jury instruc-
tions on the definition of unreasonable risk because he did not 
object to the instructions given by the court, nor did he request 
the instructions he urges for the first time on appeal. 
The court instructed the jury properly and adequately on 
the definition of unreasonable risk and the definition of negli-
gence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON DUTY TO WARN. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not correctly 
instruct the jury on the duty to warn about hazardous conditions. 
Any claim of inadequate instruction to the jury on the duty to 
warn is a claim of harmless error, because having found the con-
dition of the water slide not to be an unreasonable risk, the 
jury was not required to reach the separate issue of whether 
defendant had given adequate warning of the condition. 
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The standards for determining legal liability in this 
case are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as 
follows: 
TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS 
OF LAND TO INVITEES 
§343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, 
but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover the con-
dition, and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger, or will 
fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care 
to protect them against the danger. 
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah states the rule in 
substantially the same terras: 
43.10 
Duty Toward Business Visitor 
One who extends to a business visitor 
[invitee] an invitation, express or 
implied, [is] obliged to refrain from acts 
of negligence and to exercise ordinary 
care to keep the premises in a condition 
reasonably safe for the business visitor 
[invitee] [and for any chattels brought to 
the premises by him [her] in the reason-
able pursuit of a purpose embraced within 
the invitation]. 
In the absence of appearances that 
caution [him], or would caution a reason-
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ably prudent person in like position, to 
the contrary, the business visitor 
[invitee] has a right to assume that the 
premises he [she] was invited to enter 
are reasonably safe for the purposes for 
which the invitation was extended, and to 
act on that assumption. 
But the responsibility of one having 
control of the premises is not absolute; 
it is not that of an insurer. If there is 
danger attending upon the entry, or upon 
the work which the business visitor 
[invitee] is to do on the premises, and if 
such danger arises from conditions not 
readily apparent to the senses, and if the 
owner [occupant] has actual knowledge of 
them, or if they are discoverable by [him] 
[it] in the exercise of ordinary care, it 
is [his] duty to give reasonable warning 
of such danger to the business visitor 
[invitee]. The owner [occupant] is not 
bound to discover defects which reasonable 
inspection would not disclose, and [he] is 
entitled to assume that the business 
visitor [invitee] will perceive that which 
would be obvious to [him] upon the ordinary 
use of [his] own senses. There is no duty 
to give the business visitor [invitee] 
notice of an obvious danger. 
Plaintiff's claim of error by the court in not 
instructing the jury on duty to warn is at best harmless error. 
Before the jury reached the question of the duty owed by defen-
dant to its business patrons to exercise reasonable care to pro-
tect them by repair or warning of conditions on the premises 
which present an unreasonable risk of harm, the jury had to 
decide the question of whether the condition of the slide in fact 
amounted to an unreasonable risk. It found that the edge of the 
slide did not create an unreasonable risk, so that under the law 
there was no duty to repair or warn of the condition. Therefore, 
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any discussion of possible duty of the business proprietor to 
repair or warn is immaterial, and any possible error with respect 
to instruction on the duty of defendant to protect against 
unreasonable risk of danger is at best harmless error. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
No error . . . in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court 
. . . is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. 
It is well established that the refusal to give an instruction 
cannot be the basis for reversal unless the jury was insuf-
ficiently advised of the issue they were to determine, or it 
appears that they would have been confused or mislead to the pre-
judice of the appealing party. In Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 
106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956). Likewise, a jury verdict will be 
reversed only if the alleged error was substantial and prejudi-
cial to the appellant's rights and there is a reasonable 
likelihood that injustice or unfairness has resulted. Ewell & 
Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 
(1972). There must be shown a reasonable likelihood that in the 
absence of error, the result would have been different. Ortega 
v. Thomas, 144 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963). 
Defendant's duties toward invitees like plaintiff are 
limited to those risks which are unreasonable. It is well 
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established that the owner of property is not to be regarded as 
an insurer for an invitee upon his property. His duties toward 
invitees are limited to those risks which are unreasonable. 
Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande, 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 
(1964). With respect to the duty of care required of owners and 
occupiers of land toward invitees, Professor Prosser observed 
that, "There is no liability for harm resulting from conditions 
from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated.11 Prosser, 
Law of Torts, 4th Ed., p. 393. These statements of the law point 
out the distinction between two types of risk of harm from 
activities or conditions encountered in daily life. On the one 
hand are risks of harm which under all the circumstances are not 
unreasonable, even though there may be a remote possibility of 
injury. With respect to these risks, there is no duty owed by 
the possessor of land. On the other hand, there are conditions 
which under all the circumstances present an unreasonable risk of 
harm, sometimes referred to in the cases as a dangerous condition 
or a hazardous condition. It is only with respect to such 
unreasonable risks of harm that the law imposes a duty on the 
possessor of land to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees 
against the danger by warning or repair. For this reason, the 
issue of reasonable care by the property owner becomes material 
only if the condition on the property presented an unreasonable 
risk of harm to invitees. 
Restatement of the law, Torts §343 (1965) set forth 
above provides that a possessor of land is liable to a business 
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visitor only if he (a) knows or should know of the condition and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm; and 
(b) should expect that visitors will not discover the danger and 
protect themselves; and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger. If the jury finds as it did in 
this case that the requirement of part (a) was not proved, then 
it is entirely unnecessary for the jury to go on to consider the 
requirements of part (b) as well as part (c), which is the 
requirement of reasonable care to protect business visitors, and 
which would include the duty to repair or warn, which plaintiff 
claims was not presented to the jury by instruction. 
Warning is only one means available to the possessor of 
land to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the 
danger presented by a condition on the land which involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm. The occupier of land may also make 
the premises reasonably safe by repair. But repair or warning 
are necessary only where there is an unreasonable risk, and their 
purpose is to render the premises reasonably safe [Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §343 (1965) comment (d)] not absolutely safe 
from all possibility of injury whatsoever. 
The jury found based on competent admissible evidence 
that the water slide did not present an unreasonable risk of 
injury. Thus it found the water slide was not so dangerous as to 
invoke a duty on defendant to exercise reasonable care to protect 
plaintiff, as by repair or warning. 
Although plaintiff does not challenge directly the suf-
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ficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, plaintiff does 
point to testimony of Mr. Neal Citte, part owner and operator of 
the water slide at the time of the accident, as showing in plain-
tiff's view that the water slide was dangerous so as to require 
warning or repair. However, plaintiff overlooks substantial com-
petent evidence on which the jury was entitled to reach the oppo-
site conclusion which it did reach, that the water slide did not 
expose plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury. That evi-
dence includes the following: 
The fiberglass edge was not sharp or razorlike. It was 
simply the unfinished end of the piece of fiberglass, about one-
eighth inch thick, unfinished so that it was not smooth to the 
touch. (R. p. 432) A person can rub the edge with his hand 
without being cut. (R. p. 567) 
There was substantial evidence that riders of the 
water slide are able to control their arms and legs during the 
ride if they want to, in order to keep their hands and feet from 
coming anywhere near the unfinished edge. (Testimony of Neal 
Citte, R. pp. 471-472, 496; Testimony of former employee Barbara 
Lippold, R. pp. 518-519, 523, 529; Testimony of former employee 
Betty Durban Mayo, R. pp. 577, 578) 
There was substantial evidence that in the absence of 
horseplay, riders1 arms and legs do not come close to the outside 
edge, and plaintiff was guilty of horseplay in violation of 
posted written rules and repeated verbal warnings by employees. 
In particular, it is possible to hold back the gentle flow of 
-12-
water down the slide by using the plastic mats as a dam or dike 
at the starting pool, thereby making the slide much more slip-
pery, resulting in a faster ride. The speed of a faster ride 
throws the rider into the curves with more force, causing the 
rider to bank higher on the side of the slide. A large sign 
warned not to do this. Employees observed plaintiff and his 
group holding back the water in this way and warned them to stop. 
Plaintiff laughed at the employees, continued to misbehave, and 
acted as if he was not concerned. (R. pp. 449-451, 514-516, 523, 
526-527, 543-544, 573-575, 585-586; Exhibit 26D) 
The openness and obviousness of the fiberglass edge to 
users of the slide is evidence that it did not present an 
unreasonable risk of injury, in view of the evidence cited above 
that riders are able to control their arms and legs to avoid 
coming close to the edge if they wish to do so. This fiberglass 
edge is uniform along both sides of the slide along the full 
length of the slide from beginning to end. There was testimony 
the condition was open and obvious to any rider from the time he 
approached the entry pool to get on the slide. Plaintiff rode 
the slide from top to bottom on five or six rides before he was 
injured, and each time as he entered the slide and as he rode it, 
he saw what was there to be seen. (R. pp. 481-482, 497, 539-542) 
Although the absence of prior injuries caused by the 
fiberglass edge is not controlling on the issue of whether the 
condition presented an unreasonable risk of injury, such evidence 
certainly may be considered by the jury. Typical injuries on the 
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water slide include occasional minor cuts and bruises from riders 
colliding with each other or with the side wall of the slide. 
However, in three and one-half years of operation before this 
accident, as many as 700,000 rides down the slide had not 
resulted in anyone being cut on the fiberglass edge. Since the 
accident, as many as another 400,000 rides have been taken in two 
years up to the time of trial without another such injury. (R. 
pp. 463, 467, 474-476, 554, 560, 561, 576) 
The only expert opinion in evidence at trial on the 
issue of liability was that the fiberglass edge was not an 
unreasonable risk to users of the water slide. (Testimony of Val 
T. Stratford, R. p. 561; Testimony of Neal Citte, R. p. 476) 
Plaintiff1s brief quotes testimony by Mr. Citte that it 
is possible for persons riding the water slide to lose control of 
their arms or legs and allow them to hang over the edge of the 
slide. However, Mr. Citte also testified about his experience 
with the water slide and his familiarity with it, and that he did 
not recognize the risk of an arm or a leg being cut by the 
fiberglass edge as being a hazard, although it could happen. He 
did not post a warning about the fiberglass edge because he did 
not feel it presented a problem to users of the water slide, 
unless they held back the water in violation of the rules. (R. 
pp. 449-452, 481) 
Based on the above evidence, the jury was entitled to 
conclude that the fiberglass edge did not amount to an unreason-
able risk of harm to plaintiff. Consequently, defendant had no 
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legal duty to repair or warn of the condition. The absence of 
instruction to the jury on the duty to warn was harmless to the 
outcome of the trial, and is not a ground for ordering a new 
trial. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO DUTY TO WARN OF THE CONDITION 
OF THE WATER SLIDE WHICH WAS AS OPEN AND 
OBVIOUS TO PLAINTIFF AS TO DEFENDANT. 
Even assuming the unfinished edge beyond the lip on each 
side of the water slide had amounted to a condition which was 
hazardous or dangerous, there is no duty to warn where the con-
dition is as easily observable to the invitee as to the owner. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A (1965) states: 
§343A. Known or Obvious Dangers. 
(1) A possessor of land is not 
liable to his invitees for physical harm 
caused to them by any activity or con-
dition on the land whose danger is known 
or obvious to them, unless the possessor 
should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness. 
Comment (c) to that section adds: 
The possessor's activities may 
involve a risk which is known or obvious 
to those who enter his land, either 
because the risk is inherent in the nature 
of the activity itself, or because they 
are aware that it is carried on in a 
manner which involves risks that are not 
necessarily inherent in such activities. 
Comment (b) adds: 
. . . "obvious" means that both the con-
dition and the risk are apparent to and 
would be recognized by a reasonable man, 
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in the position of the visitor, exercising 
ordinary perception, intelligence, and 
judgment. 
In Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978), this 
rule was applied to affirm summary judgment for defendant where 
plaintiff was injured when he tried to help free a horse which 
had become entangled in a chain because of defendant's alleged 
negligence in tying the horse to a post. In Steele v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., supra, this court affirmed 
dismissal as a matter of law of the claim by an automobile driver 
who was struck by a train in a railroad crossing after 
approaching under conditions which gave the driver a normal 
opportunity to see and hear the approach of the train. 
Likewise in this case, there was no duty to warn of the 
fiberglass edge because of the obviousness of the condition, and 
plaintiff cannot complain of the court's decision not to give 
an instruction on the duty to warn. 
The cases cited by plaintiff are not on point. In 
O'Dell v. Cook's Market, Inc., 432 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.App. 1968), the 
court in fact afffirmed a directed verdict against plaintiff and 
in favor of defendant in a slip and fall claim, on the grounds 
that the substance on the floor of defendant's market was a con-
dition which was as obvious and well known to plaintiff as to 
defendant. In that case, the court referred to the mixture of 
water and lettuce or cabbage leaves on the floor of a grocery 
market as being a dangerous condition which would invoke a duty 
by defendant to remove the substance or warn customers. While 
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the existance of slippery foreign substance on the floors of 
retail stores may in some cases create an unreasonable risk of 
danger toward invitees, nevertheless the fiberglass edge of the 
water slide is an entirely different condition, and plaintiff's 
reliance on language in the 0f Dell case about duty to warn of 
dangerous conditions begs the question of whether the egde of the 
water slide was a dangerous condition, which question the jury 
answered in the negative. Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 
703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983), was plaintiff's appeal from summary 
judgment in favor of certain defendants. Plaintiff was injured 
in a propane gas explosion caused by an electric spark from the 
motor of a water cooler leased by defendant Ozone Waters, Inc. 
and on the premises of defedant Ashland Chemical, Inc. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ozone but 
reversed the summary judgment in favor of Ashland Chemical, 
finding there was a question of fact for the trier of fact on 
whether Ashland had created an unreasonable risk of harm to 
plaintiff. As it may apply to the instant case, this opinion is 
authority that an injured plaintiff is required to prove that 
11
 the risk from which his damage resulted posed an unreasonable 
risk of harm.11 703 F.2d at 924. In the instant case, that 
question was presented to the jury which answered in the nega-
tive. In Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977), the 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for defendants 
and remanded for trial, holding there was a jury question on 
whether defendants created an unreasonable risk of harm in 
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marketing slingshots directly to children. Again, this decision 
is authority that the issue of whether particular conduct amounts 
to an unreasonable risk of harm is a question of fact for the 
jury. Although the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the restate-
ment factors of balancing the utility of conduct and the magni-
tude of the risk in determining whether the summary judgment 
should be reversed, nowhere did the court suggest that the 
factors bearing on utility of conduct and magnitude of risk must 
be presented to the jury in instructions at trial. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS DEFINING UNREASONABLE RISK 
BECAUSE HE DID NOT MAKE A MEANINGFUL 
OBJECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND 
DID NOT REQUEST THE INSTRUCTION HE URGES 
ON APPEAL. 
Point II of appellant's brief on appeal argues that the 
trial court failed to instruct the jury about the legal defini-
tion of unreasonable risk or the factors to be considered in 
deciding whether or not a risk is unreasonable, along the lines 
of the balancing test between social utility on the one hand and 
the magnitude of risk of injury on the other hand, of §§291 and 
292, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 
However, at the trial of this case appellant offered to 
the court no proposed instructions to the jury which dealt with 
any such definition of reasonable risk and unreasonable risk. 
Further, the objections which plaintiff stated to the jury 
instructions given by the court do not contain any reference to 
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the supposed lack of instruction on the definition of reasonable 
risk and unreasonable risk. (R. pp. 500-503) 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
the court shall give the parties an opportunity to make objec-
tions, and they shall be made, out of the hearing of the jury and 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. 
No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless 
he objects thereto. In objecting to the 
giving of an instruction, a party must 
state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. 
It is well established that a party on appeal may not 
assign as error either the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he first proposes a correct instruction. If 
the court fails to give the requested instruction, the complain-
ing party must then have made exception on the record in terras 
specific enough to give the trial court notice of every error in 
the court's instructions which is complained of on appeal. 
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, 
Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983); Snyderville Transportation Co., 
Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980); DeBry & 
Hilton Travel Services, Inc. v. Capitol International Airways, 
Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1975); Williamson v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., 487 
P.2d 316, 26 Utah 2d 178 (1971); State Road Coram, v. Kendell, 438 
P.2d 178, 20 Utah 2d 356 (1968). 
A claim of error, in regard to failure to instruct the 
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jury on a certain theory, cannot be claimed for the first time on 
appeal. Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 
1979), cert, denied 100 S.Ct. 306, 444 U.S. 945, 26 L.Ed.2d 314. 
This is not a case where the Supreme Court in its 
discretion and in the interests of justice, should review the 
failure to give this instruction in spite of appellant's failure 
to request the instruction and make any objection at trial. 
Certainly, this Supreme Court may exercise such review in its 
discretion. Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Beehive 
Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 
1983); E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & 
Sons, Inc., supra. Such review is limited to unusual circum-
stances where some gross injustice or inequity would otherwise 
result. 
This trial was conducted in a regular manner, and ade-
quate opportunity was given to counsel to submit proposed 
instructions and state objections on the record. Plaintiff 
availed himself of both of these opportunities on other matters, 
but with respect to the error he now claims, he neither submitted 
a proposed instruction nor took exception. 
In the present case, the fact that the court did not 
instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable risk and 
unreasonable risk now urged by plaintiff on appeal, in the 
absence of any suggestion from plaintiff at trial that such 
instruction should have been given, is certainly not a gross 
injustice or inequity, where the concept of reasonable risk and 
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unreasonable risk was discussed in the court's instruction in the 
explanation to Special Interrogatory No. 1, within the standard 
of whether the risk would have been acceptable to an ordinary 
prudent person exercising reasonable care. It should be noted 
that this instruction language is substantially similar to the 
wording of Restatement (Second) §343 which plaintiff did propose 
as his requested jury instruction No. 3, that an unreasonable 
risk of harm was one which would have been realized as such by a 
person in the position of defendant with the exercise of reason-
able care. In other words, plaintiff obtained as much jury 
instruction on the definition of unreasonable risk, as he asked 
for. 
Finally, plaintiff waived his right on appeal to claim 
error in the trial court instruction on unreasonable risk because 
he did not preserve that claim in his docketing statement. Rule 
9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as its predecessor, 
Rule 73A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the man-
datory docketing statement on appeal shall contain the issues 
presented by the appeal. Plaintiff filed an unsuccessful motion 
for a new trial and also filed a docketing statement in this 
appeal, and in neither document does he suggest that the trial 
court committed error in failing to define reasonable risk and 
unreasonable risk in instructions to the jury. Plaintiff1s only 
claim up to that point was that the court failed to instruct the 
jury that defendant had a duty to remove or guard any dangerous 
condition or give warning, as plaintiff claimed the rule to be 
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under §343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Defendant then 
filed a motion for summary disposition of this appeal, pointing 
out that the issue was harmless error because since the jury 
found that the condition of the slide did not amount to an 
unreasonable risk of danger under §343, there was no duty to 
repair or warn. It was only subsequent to the filing and denial 
of this motion for summary disposition that plaintiff for the 
first time raised the issue of instructions on the definition of 
unreasonable risk, in his appeal brief. Under these circum-
stances, plaintiff waived his right to make this argument on 
appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY PROPERLY 
ON THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE RISK AND 
UNREASONABLE RISK UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Taking all of the instructions together as a whole, the 
jury was told that an unreasonable risk was one of such magnitude 
that an ordinary, prudent person exercising reasonable care would 
know the exposure was unacceptable. The jury was told that it 
should determine whether or not leaving the edge as it was left 
exposed the business patrons to an unreasonable risk of injury, 
or whether leaving the edge as it was left was reasonable and, 
therefore, not negligent. Negligence was properly defined as 
"the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would 
have done under the circumstances, or doing what such person 
under the circumstances would not have done. The fault may lie 
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in acting or in omitting to act." 
Therefore, the jury was fully instructed not only on the 
negligence standard in abstract, but also on the application of 
that standard to the condition of the water slide as it existed 
at the time of plaintiff's injury. This guidance was adequate 
and appropriate. If plaintiff's counsel had felt the need to 
inform the jury of plaintiff's position that the condition of the 
water slide showed very low social utility and unacceptable risk 
of danger, he was free to do so in closing argument by urging 
that reasonable and prudent people in the position of defendant 
would not tolerate such a risk to customers. 
This case was tried on a theory of negligence, and the 
jury was instructed on the basis of the negligence standard of 
care. In addition, the jury was given particular instruction 
applying that standard of care to the condition of the water 
slide. Plaintiff's argument that the court committed error in 
not giving additional instruction detailing the specific factors 
which are considered in determining the utility of an actor's 
conduct and the magnitude of risk under §§292 and 293, would 
require detail in the instructions which would be neither 
necessary nor reasonable, and would be more likely to confuse the 
jury than to provide further guidance. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §282 (1965) defines 
negligence in the context of reasonable risk and unreasonable 
risk: 
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§282. Negligence Defined. 
In the Restatement of this Subject, negli-
gence is conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable 
risk of harm. * * * 
It is evident that a proper definition of negligence by 
reference to the conduct of a reasonable and prudent person under 
the circumstances, which was the instruction given by the court, 
implicitly provides for a finding on the reasonableness of the 
risk of harm, since by definition, negligent conduct involves an 
unreasonable risk. Nowhere in the jurisprudence of this state 
has it been found necessary to offer additional instructions on 
balancing social utility and magnitude of risk in negligence 
actions, and the trial court in this case certainly did not abuse 
its discretion in instructing the jury as it did. Plaintiff has 
pointed to no decision in any jurisdiction which held it was 
reversible error to fail to give the instructions which plaintiff 
urges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant/respondent 
requests that the court affirm the judgment entered by the trial 
court on the jury verdict. 
Dated this / [ day of June, 1985. 
STRONG fr^^fl C 
Roger H. Bullock 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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INSTRUCTION NO. " 
You will not render a general verdict as is sometimes 
done, but rather your function herein is to make findings of fact 
as to special interrogatories or questions which are herewith 
submitted to you. In making your findings of fact, you should 
bear in mind that the burden of proof in any disputed fact rests 
on the party claiming the fact to be true and he must prove it by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
Before you answer "yes" to any question submitted to 
you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the 
evidence. This requires the agreement of six (three-quarters) of 
the jurors to answer any question and at least six 
(three-quarters) of the jurors must agree that the answer to the 
question should be "yes" or "no" before such an answer may be 
made. 
A special verdict form is as follows: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Do you find it proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
was negligent in the manner in which he used the 
slides with the edge as it was and did expose the 
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury? 
YES 
NO 
EXPLANATION: The jury is instructed that all parties 
invited to a business premise are entitled in law to presume that 
the premises are reasonably safe for the conducting of business 
activity. They may act on this assumption until something 
happens to put them on notice to the contrary. If they discover, 
or with the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered, 
that a hazard was present then they should act as a reasonably 
prudent person should act under the circumstances to avoid that 
hazard. The business has a right to assume that people will act 
safely for their concern. If the business discovers that its 
patrons are not exercising ordinary care, then he must take such 
action as a reasonably prudent person would under the 
circumstances. 
The nature of the activity and the circumstances 
surrounding it may be discovered by the parties. In sports 
activity, a person assumes the ordinary risks that are well-known 
in the sport. An example of this is someone who sits himself in 
the right field bleachers in a baseball park. He is assumed to 
know, or hope, that a baseball may strike the area and he assumes 
351 
that risk. However, if the ball park manager allowed the 
bleachers to get in such a state of disrepair that they collapsed 
then this would not be an assumed risk* The jury should consider 
the nature of the activity on the defendant's premises and 
determine whether or not leaving the edge as it was left exposed 
the business patrons to an unreasonable risk of injury, or 
whether leaving the edge as it was left was reasonable and, 
therefore, not negligent. They would be entitled to assume that 
the guest knew the ordinary, accepted risk in the sport, but it 
would be unreasonable to expose the customers to a risk of such 
magnitude that an ordinary, prudent person exercising reasonable 
care would know the exposure was unacceptable. 
The plaintiff alleges that leaving the edge as it was 
left exposed him to an unreasonable risk of injury. The 
defendant denies that this was an exposure to an unreasonable 
risk. The Court instructs the jury to determine whether or not 
the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof on this issue. If 
the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof, you should answer 
this question "yes". If you answer the question "no", return to 
the courtroom as you have disposed of the case. If you answer 
the question "yes", answer Interrogatory No. 1A, the following 
question. 
352 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1A: Do you find it proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence 
referred to in Interrogary No. 1 was a proximate 
cause of the cutting of plaintiff's extension 
tendon on his right toe? 
YES 
NO 
EXPLANATION: The phrase "proximate cause" is defined in 
a separate instruction. The plaintiff alleges that there was 
present an unreasonable risk of injury, and that that risk is the 
proximate cause of his injuries. The defendant alleges that even 
if the jury answers the first question "yes", their negligence 
was not a proximate cause of the injury. Further, defendant 
alleges that the plaintiff's misuse of the slide was the sole 
proximate cause of his injury. This issue is left for the jury 
to determine whether or not plaintiff has carried the burden of 
proof. If you answer Question 1A "yes", answer the following 
question, otherwise return to the courtroom. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Do you find it proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent in that he misused 
the equipment at the time his toe was injured? 
YES 
NO 
EXPLANATION; The burden of proof is upon the defendant 
on this allegation. Unless they carry it by a preponderance of 
the evidence plaintiff would be entitled to an answer of "no". 
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All persons are expected to use ordinary care to avoid injuring 
themselves. They are required to make the ordinary observations 
to adapt their conduct to that of a reasonably prudent person. 
The defendant alleges that the circumstantial evidence here 
presented demonstrates that the injury could not have occurred 
had the plaintiff not been misusing the equipment in holding back 
the water or taking other unreasonable risks. The plaintiff 
denies any misuse of the equipment. The burden of proof is on 
the defendant to prove that the answer to this question should be 
"yes". 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2A: Do you find it proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence 
found present in Question No. 2 was a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries? 
xES 
NO 
EXPLANATION: The phrase "proximate cause" is defined 
elsewhere in the instructions. The defendant alleges that the 
circumstantial evidence proves that the accident occurred during 
improper use of the equipment, and also alleges that the 
circumstantial evidence shows that the proximate cause of the 
injury would have to be some misuse of the equipment. The burden 
of proof is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's 
negligence was one of the proximate causes of the injury. 
Plaintiff denies this. The burden of proof is on the defendant. 
If you have found that both of the parties were 
negligent and that their negligence was a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries, then you must answer the following 
question. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 3: Considering all of the fault 
that caused the injury to be 100%, what share of 
the percentage should be assigned to each of the 
parties? 
Plaintiff: % 
Defendant: i. 
TOTAL: 100% 
EXPLANATION: The law provides that if a plaintiff is 
more at fault in causing his own injuries, then he cannot use the 
courts and recover thereby. Therefore, if each of the parties is 
50% to blame, there can be no recovery. If the defendant is more 
at fault than the plaintiff, then the plaintiff may recover to 
the extent that the injury was caused by the defendant. In other 
words, if the apportionment was 75% the defendant's fault and 25% 
the plaintiff's fault, the plaintiff recovery would be limited to 
75%. The jury does not make this calculation but gives the judge 
the total figure and the judge reduces it appropriately. 
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The law provides no formula for figuring the percentage 
of faultf this is left to the discretion of the jury. 
If you answer that the defendant was negligent and his 
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, and that the 
plaintiff was not negligent or his negligence was less than 50% 
of the proximate cause of the injury, then you must determine the 
amount to award plaintiff, which is the basis of the next 
question. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4; What sum do you find it 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence is 
proper to award plaintiff in each of the following 
categories? 
a) past (before trial) special 
medical expenses $ 
b) past lost wages $ 
c) future medical expenses $ 
d) future lost earnings $ 
e) general damages (up to 
date of trial) $ 
f) future general damages $_ 
TOTAL AWARD $_ 
EXPLANATION: You are instructed that if the plaintiff 
has proven that he is entitled to damages, they should be awarded 
to the degree that he has shown them to be present by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, or with reasonable medical certainty 
will occur in the future. 
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The plaintiff alleges that all of the damages he has 
suffered were caused by the initial negligence of the defendant. 
The defendant contends that even if he is held responsible for 
the intial injury of the plaintiff, the award should be reduced 
and not include any damages brought on by a failure of the 
plaintiff to care for his own injury or injury resulting from an 
event that is sufficiently remote that in common sense should be 
a separate event. Defendant alleges that the breaking of the pin 
was not caused by the cut on the toe. The plaintiff alleges it 
was. The issue is left to the jury. The burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff. 
357 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or doing 
what such person under such circumstances would not have done. 
The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act. 
ROGER H. BULLOCK #4 85 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH S\) 
— )¥-
WALTER WAGONER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WATERSLIDE INCORPORATED dba 
BURCH CREEK WATERSLIDE, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter having come on duly for 
trial, Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, on October 2 and 3, 
1984, with plaintiff represented by counsel, James R. Hasenyager, 
and defendant represented by counsel, Roger H. Bullock, and third-
party defendant represented by counsel, Jack L. Schoenhals, 
And a jury having been duly impaneled, and evidence 
having been adduced by all parties, and the court and jury having 
heard arguments of counsel, and the jury having been duly instructed 
in the law and having deliberated and returned its verdict in 
4' 
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answer to special interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Do you find it proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant was negligent in the manner in 
which he used the slides with the edge as 
it was and did expose the plaintiff to an 
unreasonable risk of injury? 
YES 
NO X 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that third-party defendant Great Basin Engineering does have and 
recover a directed verdict against defendant and third-party 
plaintiff on the third-party complaint, no cause of action; and 
defendant Waterslide, Incorporated dba Burch Creek Waterslide 
does and recover judgment against plaintiff on the complaint, no 
cause of action, together with costs. 
DATED t h i s / day of October, 1984. 
n . . ^ 
A / 
/ / 
/ <U John F. WanTquist, Judg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a .true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ ^ d a y of 
fVjJbhAl 1984, t o : 
James R. Hasenyager 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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